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Fascist Aspirants: Fascist Forge and Ideological Learning in the Extreme-
right Online Milieu 
Learning in extremist settings is often treated as operational, with little regard to 
how aspiring participants in extremist settings engage with complex and abstract 
ideological material. This paper examines learning in the context of the 
amorphous network of digital channels that compose the extreme-right online 
milieu. Through an in-depth qualitative analysis, we explore how well the 
prevailing model of extremist ideological learning (in ‘communities of practice’) 
accounts for the behaviour of aspiring participants of Fascist Forge, a now-
defunct extreme-right web forum. The findings suggest that some of the social 
aspects of communities of practice have been replicated in the online setting of 
Fascist Forge. However, for a combination of technical and ideological reasons, 
the more directed and nurturing aspects of learning have not. Several issues are 
raised about the role of ideological learning in online communities, notably the 
open accessibility of extremist material, the lack of ideological control leading to 
potential mutation and innovation by self-learners, and the role of digital learning 
in the preparation, shaping and recruitment of individuals for real world 
organising and activism.  
Keywords: extremism; learning; ideology; extreme-right; Fascist Forge; 
communities of practice 
Introduction 
The emergence of an extreme-right online milieu has been well-charted, from the 
earliest developments to the more recent move towards alternative and encrypted 
platforms (Berlet, 2008; Jackson, 2020). Most recently there have emerged a new cohort 
of extreme-right groups with similar aesthetics and ideological convictions, many 
tracing their influences through the web forum Iron March and the works of James 
Mason. Much of this development has taken place in a web of interconnecting platforms 
and channels referred to here as the extreme-right online milieu (Lee & Knott, 2020).  
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This paper discusses ideological learning in online extremist settings, an 
increasingly important subject generated by the move to online political organisation 
and communications. The focus here is on the extreme-right milieu, but the issues are 
no less relevant for other extremist online settings in which the acquisition and 
maintenance of key beliefs and practices between followers and across cohorts is 
important, whether jihadist, white supremacist, anarchist, or related to conspiracy 
theories or single issues. We draw on theories of social learning (Bandura, 1971; Akers 
1998), building on work done previously in terrorism studies which utilises the concept 
of ‘communities of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991). While ideology has often been 
narrowly understood in this field, we take a broader view, treating ideologies as 
practical as well as conceptual, and going beyond explicitly ideological material like 
propaganda and reading lists to include the range of cultural practices and artefacts that 
constitute any ideological space (Freeden, 2000; Koehler, 2015; Knott & Lee, 2020).1 
We see activists as not only needing to learn the basics of their beliefs, but also how to 
carry themselves, how to address others both supportive and hostile, and how to behave 
in extremist settings, including online spaces (Crone, 2016).  
We take for a case study the extreme-right web forum Fascist Forge. The site 
was an online ideological and social environment with members who subscribed to a 
radical interpretation of fascism with an emphasis on esotericism. No space in the 
extreme-right milieu can be considered typical. Nevertheless, Fascist Forge constitutes 
a valuable case study that speaks to an ideological interpretation of fascism that is 
                                                 
1 For further elaboration of what we mean by ‘ideology’ and its relationship to radicalisation 
and extremism, see Knott & Lee (2020).  
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under-represented in research, was not directly aligned with any specific group,2 and 
operated as an online community in a similar way to much of the extreme-right online 
milieu.     
In what follows, we set out the ideological background to Fascist Forge, review 
the current state of research on ideological learning in terrorism studies, and then, 
through an in-depth qualitative analysis focused on introductory posts and responses on 
Fascist Forge, attempt to reconcile the two. The conclusions suggest that, for reasons of 
both design and ideology, Fascist Forge constituted only a weak community of practice 
with limited opportunities for the kind of nurturing and mentoring often seen in offline 
extremist spaces. Nevertheless, it provided newcomers with ample examples of fascist 
behaviour and style on which to model their own identities. The analysis also raises the 
possibility that successful public engagement on Fascist Forge was a way to 
demonstrate ideological commitment and thereby gain access to deeper, more private 
formalised structures. 
Fascist Forge: Ideological Formation and Relationships  
Fascist Forge emerged as an intended successor to the now infamous web forum, Iron 
March, influential on a number of extreme-right groups that emerged from 2013 
onwards, including National Action and Atomwaffen Division (Macklin, 2018).3 After 
                                                 
2 Although there is some evidence to suggest that the founder member of Fascist Forge was 
involved in recruiting members of the extreme-right group known as The Base (BBC1, 
2020). 
3 In November 2019 a back-up version of Iron March was posted on the Internet Archive by a 
user by the name of ‘antifa-data’, a possible source being an archive linked to by a Fascist 
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Iron March was shut down for unknown reasons in November 2017, Fascist Forge was 
launched in May 2018.4 The ‘About Us’ section made direct reference to the forum 
being modelled after Iron March (Fascist Forge, 2018). As of early 2020, Fascist Forge 
went offline for a second time, having had a period offline in the Spring of 2019 
(Lamoureux, 2019).  
Ideologically Fascist Forge was informed by the works of US ideologue James 
Mason as set out in a series of essays written in the 1980s and later assembled in the 
volume Siege.5 From this starting point others have developed the ideas of Mason: key 
texts include Next Leap, Zero Tolerance, A Squire’s Trial, and the website Siege 
Culture. Mason set out a doctrine he termed Universal Order that moved beyond the 
essentially ‘positive’ vision of National Socialism to argue that the battle for national 
and racial survival was over and that supporters were living under the yoke of an all-
encompassing ‘system’ intrinsically hostile to Whites. Conventional political ideology 
of any form was utterly rejected as being a product of the system and thereby designed 
to perpetuate the system’s power. This elitism and refusal to compromise effectively 
                                                 
Forge user on the website Mega.nz. This archive included a back-up copy of the Iron March 
forum as well as extensive collections of literature and images. Subsequently, several 
accounts on the forum were connected to real world identities of members through email 
addresses, IP addresses and other data (Lamoureux & Makuch, 2019). 
4 The Iron March founder and chief ideologue Slavros, known to be a resident of Moscow, may 
have become subject to government pressure at the time of a wider split in the Russian 
extreme-right over the Russian annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
(SPLC 2019; see also Due Enstad 2018). 
5 Siege has since been republished in several versions. For more on the book and its content see 
Johnson & Feldman, forthcoming. 
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divided Universal Order adherents from the wider extreme-right and any attempt at 
movement building. The document Zero Tolerance, published by Iron March founder 
Alexander Slavros, proclaimed fascism as adherence to ‘truth’, concluding therefore 
that any compromise position was impossible (Slavros, 2017; see also SPLC 2019). 
As total as the system’s control is, Mason was convinced that it was heading 
towards an inevitable collapse. Less well-developed than the critique of the present 
system is the future set out by Universal Order. Mason suggested that the coming 
collapse would be a chance to begin again without ‘alien or renegade influence’, 
creating an organic purely White society. From a security perspective, the main concern 
with this idea is not the belief that society is collapsing, but that this is both necessary 
and desirable for any progress to be made. Therefore, in some instances, actions to 
accelerate the fall of the system are held to be justified (‘total attack’ in the language of 
Siege). Explicit references to violent action are plentiful in Siege (Johnson & Feldman, 
forthcoming). However, the overall tone, while militant, is at times more ambiguous 
than might be expected. At one point, Mason advocates dropping out of the system as 
the smarter option compared to open warfare (Mason, 1986). Likewise, within the 
broader ideological sphere, Next Leap briefly considers accelerationism before 
advocating as an alternative the use of ‘merciless destructive and creative force in order 
to overcome the Modern World’ (Iron March, 2015). Similarly, a post on the website 
Siege Culture, a blog promoting Universal Order ideas, is also circumspect: ‘We neither 
condone nor condemn the actions of others. We endure here solely to educate and 
spread the truth of Universal Order as revealed to the Elect among us.’ (Rebours, 2019)  
These statements, however, need to be balanced against the extreme militancy 
and dehumanisation exhibited by these groups, as well as the apparent support and 
preparations for terrorism undertaken by members of groups influenced by Universal 
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Order fascism, including Atomwaffen Division, Sonnenkrieg Division, The Base, and 
Feuerkrieg Division (Sexton, 2019; Associated Press, 2018; BBC, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). 
There is no question that the apparent militant nihilism of groups inspired by Universal 
Order represents a security threat.  
Esoteric beliefs such as Racial Paganism, Esoteric Hitlerism, and some varieties 
of Satanism have long been linked to the extreme-right (Gardell, 2003; Goodrick-
Clarke, 2003; Kaplan, 1998; Macklin, 2015; Senholt, 2013). Iron March was 
progressing towards a more fleshed out spiritual interpretation of fascism before it 
closed. In Next Leap, site founder Slavros set out the existence of a world and a 
metaphysical superworld (Iron March, 2015). The incorporation of ‘magic’ into the 
architecture of fascism legitimised the presence of esotericism within Iron March and 
other related spaces. In Slavros’s words, esotericism was not an attempt to bolt new 
ideas onto fascism, rather it was the result of the insights fascism provided, it was 
‘fascism at its deeper roots’ (Iron March, 2015, p. 130).6 This renewed focus on esoteric 
belief was ported wholesale into Fascist Forge where members were encouraged to 
describe their religion on their personal profiles, resulting in a stunning array of niche 
                                                 
6 This is consistent with the Satanic panic that gripped Atomwaffen in 2018 as some members 
apparently embraced Satanist beliefs (Weil, 2018). In particular members of Atomwaffen 
were accused of being followers of the Order of the Nine Angles, a form of Satanism with 
historic connections to the extreme-right (Senholt, 2013).  
8 
 
and cultic beliefs including: ‘Arioperennialism’,7 Esoteric Hitlerism,8 and ATWA.9 
Repeatedly posts made by key members asserted that Fascist Forge was avowedly anti-
Christian, branding any form of Christianity a ‘Semitic desert cult’.10  
Arguably, the attempt to replicate Iron March was not a success. Fascist Forge 
appeared to outsiders to be a hostile place and, as a result, may have become an 
ideological dead-end. Following its 2019 relaunch, some of the site’s own members 
recognised the forum as too exclusive and inward looking to develop into a meaningful 
community. The doxing of several Iron March members likely heightened concerns 
over engaging in fascist activism so publicly (Bellingcat, 2019).  
Ideological Learning in Extremist Settings 
Having set out the context for this case study – the background and ideological 
                                                 
7 Arioperennialism was summarised on another site as ‘the unwavering priority of Aryan blood 
and eternity over specific sectarian and historical preferences … the radiant bloodline and 
genius of the Aryan has the potential to last forever if we successfully secure, repair and 
continue to evolve it to higher feats’ (Young, 2019). 
8 The belief that Hitler was a divine entity, most notably fused with Hindu ideas and 
observations of the Indian caste system by Savitri Devi (Devi, 1958; see also Goodrick-
Clarke, 2003; Leidig 2020) 
9 An acronym for Air Trees, Water and Animals, an uncompromising form of environmentalism 
originating with Charles Manson. 
10 Interestingly, Mason at some point identified as a believer in selected aspects of Christian 
theology, a stance which might potentially have seen him removed from Fascist Forge, 
which rejected all forms of Christianity. This may be a marker of just how far Fascist Forge 
went beyond the original incarnation of Universal Order.  
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formation of Fascist Forge and its relationship to other individuals, sites and groups – 
this section outlines the existing state of theory and knowledge on learning in extremist 
settings. Terrorism studies has an existing literature on learning and innovation (for 
summary, see Ranstorp & Normark, 2015, pp. 1-9), while further insight comes from 
general research on learning and those studies that address ideological learning in 
diverse settings. A range of approaches, data and cases have been used, and this has 
resulted in contrasting perspectives. We explain why we locate our case study within 
the small body of work that favours a community of practice approach to extremist 
learning, before setting out our analytical framework and its application.  
Many studies on extremist and terrorist transmission conceptualise learning as a 
process undertaken by individuals (e.g. Hundeide, 2003; Pearson 2015; Wilner & 
Dubouloz, 2011), with some narrowing the focus to specific types of people, for 
example children who fall into the hands of militant groups (Horgan et al., 2017; 
Hundeide, 2003), novices who join ideological cells or networks (Everton, 2016; 
Kenney, 2017, 2018; Wali, 2017), or those who seek to identify with or model 
themselves on radical exemplars (Crone, 2016; Körner & Staller, 2018). Other studies 
have looked at learning from the perspective of groups, for example, with a focus on 
how recruits or converts acquire new knowledge and skills (Galonnier & de los Rios, 
2016; Inge, 2016; Wiktorowicz, 2005), how charismatic leaders transmit their teachings 
to followers (Beekers, 2015; Gendron, 2017; Wali, 2017), or how groups learn from one 
another (Morrison, 2017; Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). One study suggests that terrorist 
learning occurs across diverse interdependent agents, including individuals, groups, and 
entire generations (Kettle & Mumford, 2017). Others focus more explicitly on 
intergenerational learning, for example, how children acquire religious or political 
beliefs and practices from older family members (Copeland, 2019; Horgan et al., 2017; 
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Lee & Knott, 2016; Scourfield et al., 2013), or on intra-generational peer transmission 
and skill development (Everton, 2015; Lee & Knott, 2017; Maher, 2014).  
Just as studies focus on different agents, they also consider different contexts. 
Many see learning as happening in a collective setting, often in the context of a wider 
ideological group or network (Galonnier & de los Rios, 2016; Horgan et al., 2017; 
Kenney, 2017; Wali, 2017). Others have examined more solitary distance learning, for 
example over the internet (Gendron, 2017; Körner & Staller, 2018; Pearson, 2015; 
Stenersen, 2013). Studies also differ on outcomes: on what is learned and for what ends. 
Accounts based in terrorism studies have generally examined strategic and tactical 
innovation (Dolnik, 2007; Jackson et al., 2005; Kettle & Mumford, 2017; Körner & 
Staller, 2018; Ranstorp & Normark, 2015), including terrorist training (Forest, 2006; 
Stenersen, 2013) and malevolent creativity (Gill et al., 2013), though the importance of 
ideology has been acknowledged by some (e.g. Dolnik, 2007; Drake, 1998) along with 
the broader role of knowledge acquisition and sharing (e.g. Forest, 2006; Kettle & 
Mumford, 2017; Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). A minority of researchers have focused 
directly on ideological and social outcomes (e.g. Hundeide, 2003; Kenney, 2017; Wali, 
2017). How people are drawn into and learn in extremist settings has also been treated 
(e.g. Khalil et al, 2019, 2020), with consideration given to imitation and shadowing 
(Hundeide, 2003; Kenney, 2017; Wali, 2017), practice and embodiment (Crone, 2016; 
Forest, 2006; Galonnier & de los Rios, 2016), and absorption of online content 
(Gendron, 2017; Körner & Staller, 2018; Pearson, 2015).  
In this case study the focus is on extremist ideological learning via a web forum. 
Of the mechanics of extremist learning identified in the literature, four are of particular 
relevance here: instruction though explicit teaching, social learning through the 
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observation and companionship of others, practical learning by ‘doing’, and lastly, self-
learning. 
Explicit ideological teaching has tended to be carried out in well-developed 
organisational settings. For example, extreme Salafi groups in the UK, such as Al-
Muhajiroun (Kenney, 2017, 2018; Wiktorowicz, 2005), Hizb-ut Tahrir (Wali, 2017) and 
the Brixton Mosque (Inge, 2017), which shared many beliefs and a common approach 
to ideological indoctrination if not ideas about violent jihad, made use of explicitly 
structured ideological teaching in the form of the halaqah, a formalised study circle 
composed of a small group of novices led by an instructor. In other cases, structured 
packages of lectures and written materials were made available online on websites or 
dedicated YouTube channels, with consumers guided through their use in programmes 
of ideological study, one example being Anwar Al-Awlaki’s ‘virtual knowledge bank’ 
(Gendron, 2010, p. 55). Traditional classroom models have also been attempted online. 
Focusing on bomb-making rather than ideology, Stenersen (2013) described a learning 
journey within Al-Qaeda from delivering bomb-making knowledge through formalised 
training within camps to an attempted distance learning bomb-making course delivered 
through online forums. The online course attempted to recreate some of the interactivity 
of the training camps by providing an instructor who could answer questions as the 
course progressed.  
A further mechanism noted in the terrorism literature with particular relevance 
to ideology is social learning. Ideologies have often been treated as cognitive systems 
constituted of discrete concepts that could be transmitted straightforwardly to individual 
recruits through a process of indoctrination or acquired by novice seekers through the 
consumption of extremist literature, videos or online content (Knott & Lee, 2020). 
Research on terrorism and ideology, however, has also begun highlighting the social 
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and practical aspects of ideology, suggesting that extremists are often less interested in 
ideological specificities than they are in the wider culture, practice and habitus of the 
milieus in which they seek to embed themselves (e.g. Crone, 2016; Holbrook & Horgan, 
2019; Khalil et al, 2019; Knott & Lee, 2020; Snow & Byrd, 2007). While formalised 
study can provide the ideological concepts and tools required to embed individuals in an 
extremist milieu, recruits also need to observe the behaviours and habits of those around 
them.  
The literature on extremist transmission and innovation reflects the social 
aspects of learning as theorized by earlier scholars from Bandura onwards (Bandura 
1971; for discussion see Lee & Knott, 2018, pp. 29-35). In her seminal study on The 
Making of a Moonie, Barker (1984) discussed the social factors contributing to (the 
often unsuccessful) recruitment and learning in the Unification Church, including ‘love 
bombing’, companionship and loyalty. She recognised the importance, not only of a 
sense of belonging, but of learning by doing and acquiring a sense of self-worth 
(Barker, 1984, p. 244). Hundeide (2003), who was aware of research by sociologists 
working on conversion and cults, was the first to draw explicitly on the concept of 
‘communities of practice’ in the context of extremism. He saw its relevance for 
identifying the behaviours of individuals accepted into those extremist groups which 
required loyalty from their members. Hundeide (2003, pp. 107-108) drew critically on 
the 1991 study by Lave and Wenger (see also Wenger, 1998; Brown & Duguid, 1999) 
in order to investigate the process undertaken in becoming a ‘committed insider’ in an 
extremist organisation. The individuals he researched went from being newbies engaged 
in 'legitimate peripheral participation' in a community of practice to eventually being 
accepted as more skilled and committed members (Hundeide, 2003, p. 121; see also 
Horgan, 2009, p. 146). The environment was participatory and social, with the 
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mentality, style, and attitudes of insiders all transmitted through observation of others 
rather than formal instruction. This concept of social learning is also closely related to 
arguments about the effect of long-term exposure to extremist content, also referred to 
as enculturation (Holt et al., 2017) or normalisation (Munn, 2019).  
The role of more experienced participants as exemplars for newcomers has also 
been highlighted in case studies of Islamist extremism. Kenney's observation of al-
Muhajiroun in the UK noted the extent to which the group conformed to the community 
of practice model, with novices shadowing more experienced veterans, and 'learning 
from companionship' (Kenney, 2017, p. 6). Personal interactions between new members 
and those who were more experienced also built group solidarity and belonging. Similar 
relationships were also reported in Canadian skinhead formations (Gaudette et al, 2020), 
where interactions between online and offline worlds were reported. Less well-
researched is how communities of practice in extremist settings operate in the context of 
an online milieu that lacks the physical proximity and social cues of such offline 
interactions.11 Indeed, the distinction between online interactions in which ideas and 
beliefs are collectively learned and shared, and the use by isolated independent learners 
of resources made available by online groups or forums is yet to be fully examined. The 
relationship between these two distinct types of engagement to the concept of an online 
community of practice needs further discussion and elaboration. Studies of one well-
known extreme-right web forum, Stormfront, have suggested that engagement between 
participants constitutes an online community (Bowman-Grieve, 2009; De Koster & 
Houtman, 2008; Thompson, 2001). Likewise, research from outside terrorism studies 
                                                 




has provided accounts of how corporate ‘virtual communities of practice’ can increase 
engagement, build trust and maximise knowledge-sharing (Gammelgaard, 2010; Haas et 
al., 2020). Less clear, however, is how the concept of ‘communities of practice’ may 
fare when applied to online spaces in which distrust and paranoia rather than 
collaboration and engagement are more the norm, as is the case in Fascist Forge.    
Alongside social learning, but closely related, scholars have also noted the role 
of practice in extremist learning, with recruits encouraged in some settings to learn by 
‘having a go’. This was a key aspect of the community of practice approach developed 
by Lave and Wenger. Participation in such a community was centred on skills 
acquisition and ‘learning as doing’ (Wenger, 1998, p. 5). The focus on practice, 
however, should not be thought to stand in opposition to one based either on social 
learning or on the transmission of ideas and beliefs. They are mutually engaged and 
supportive (Knott & Lee, 2020). Returning to Kenney’s study, in al-Muhajiroun, street 
preaching, or da'wah, provided a good opportunity for newcomers to learn what to say 
and how to say it by first observing other more experienced activists (Kenney, 2017, p. 
7).12  
Finally, less common in the terrorism literature has been the discussion of self-
learning, particularly via the internet. In practical arenas, self-learning may be difficult 
and sometimes dangerous. Bomb-making for example is a highly technical skill fraught 
with risk. The narratives attached to lone actor terrorists frequently centre on the 
difficulties they encounter creating viable explosive devices (McLagan & Lowles, 2000; 
Stenersen, 2013). For ideology, independent learning is less high-stakes but no less 
                                                 
12 See Crone (2016) for further examples and a theoretical justification for learning by practice 
in a jihadi context.  
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complex. It has been mentioned in militant autobiographies and lone actor narratives 
(Copeland, 2019). Self-accounts presented in court and police interviews also reveal 
evidence of it, such as those given by Norwegian terrorist, Anders Breivik (Önnerfors, 
2017), and Roshonara Choudhry, who stabbed a UK Member of Parliament in 2010 
after devouring ideological material online at home alone (Pearson, 2015). It is 
somewhat surprising then that more consideration has not been given in terrorist studies 
to the process of self-learning, in which independent individuals identify, sift, absorb, 
and sometimes act upon online resources from one or more sources. Further work is 
needed to establish whether such individuals consider themselves to be participants in 
virtual communities or merely individuals building independent ideological portfolios.13           
The available literature leans towards a focus on operational over ideological 
learning, and on group-based instruction over self-learning. The remainder of this paper, 
focused on Fascist Forge, serves as a counter study which seeks to identify and analyse 
the mechanics of learning in a new context, that of the extreme-right online milieu. In 
our assessment of learning in this space, we ask the following questions: First, what 
does an in-depth case study of this extreme-right web forum contribute to our 
knowledge of the four aspects of explicit ideological teaching, social learning, learning 
as practice, and self-learning? Secondly, drawing comparatively on Kenney’s 
ethnographic analysis of al-Muhajiroun, to what extent does Fascist Forge constitute an 
online ‘community of practice’, and how and why does learning in these two 
‘communities’ differ? Finally, what is the role of ideology in forging an extreme online 
community of practice and in informing the kind of learning that takes place within it? 
                                                 
13 Research on lone actors and leaderless resistance touches on these matters (e.g. Berntzen & 
Sandberg, 2014; Sweeney, 2017). 
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Data and Methods  
The data to answer these questions was sourced from the website Fascist Forge, which 
was available online from May 2018 to February 2019, and then again from April 2019 
to early 2020 (Lamoureux, 2019; Lamoureux & Makuch, 2019).14 The site was 
structured as an anonymous online forum and divided into three sections: ‘The Forge’, a 
space to post resources and for general discussion topics; ‘The Crucible’, which 
featured resources orientated explicitly towards learning, including a space set aside for 
forum members to introduce themselves; and a section entitled ‘Club Forums’. Of the 
forums, the ‘Discussion’ and ‘Introduction’ sub-forums were the most heavily trafficked 
with 1,002 and 1,847 posts respectively (as of the end of November 2019). Although 
much of the site was open, private communications between vetted users were possible 
in a ‘members only’ area.15  
Developing a broad picture of the Fascist Forge user base required building a 
dataset offering insight into the characteristics of participants. An introductory space 
was set aside for newcomers to introduce themselves to the wider Fascist Forge forum, 
using a loose template that invited information on how the user found the site, their 
                                                 
14 The Fascist Forge website, including introductions posted by newcomers, is archived online. 
15 The members-only area was referred to in March 2019 in a discussion thread on ‘Approach to 
Newcomers’ (in post by user, id86); Lamoureux & Makuch (2019). In accordance with 
social science research ethics we stopped short of covert research, which in this case would 
have required adopting a pseudonym and masquerading as a genuine initiate. As a result, we 
were not able to access private areas. Unlike investigative journalists and security 
practitioners operating in this space, we were observers, not participants, and our research 
was confined to openly accessible material. 
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motivation for registering, goals, political history, interests and skills. In practice, posts 
rarely followed this format exactly, often to the annoyance of longer-standing members. 
In addition to these free-form introductory posts, fixed-format profiles included details 
on when that person joined, their age, and location (as well as their political and 
religious identities, see below). Not all members completed profiles, and not all profiles 
contained the same information. For example, details such as age were often replaced 
with numbers related to extreme-right numerology, e.g. 1488 or 88.  
Introductory posts made between May 2018 and August 2019 were downloaded, 
resulting in 354 individual introductions (many of which included responses by other 
users). These formed the basis of the dataset. This number (354) is significantly smaller 
than the membership number claimed for the site overall: more than 1,300 by the end of 
November 2019 (see Counter Extremism Project, 2019). The latter may be an over-
estimate; some posts may have been deleted; or some newcomers may have acquired 
membership status without first introducing themselves.  
A first stage content analysis was undertaken, with individual posts coded for 
age, gender, location, political history, pathway to the site, and motivations of the user. 
As the data were often unstructured and incomplete, with individual users interpreting 
the template in different ways, neither the dataset nor the initial analysis can be said to 
offer a full and complete picture of the user-base. Nevertheless, as a broad set of 
indicators, they serve to give a general idea of the make-up of Fascist Forge users.  
Identifying data on learning and learners was partially based on this initial phase 
of content analysis, but further rounded out with a second phase of analysis in which an 
in-depth qualitative approach was used. All 354 introductory posts were analysed and 
coded using an interpretive framework developed for an earlier project on ideological 
transmission in extremist contexts (Knott & Lee, 2020, p. 10) in which we identified six 
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dimensions transmission and learning: purposive, substantive, practical, social, temporal 
and spatial. With our research questions centring on Fascist Forge as a community of 
practice, we focused our attention on the practical and social dimensions of learning (on 
how newcomers learn and engage with extremist ideology, and the social dynamics at 
work in that process), although we were also mindful of their motivations for 
participating in this learning community (the purposive dimension). While we were 
interested in what users learned, we have not discussed this here to avoid repeating 
information presented earlier on the ideological formation of Fascist Forge. In addition 
to introductory posts captured in the dataset, we also drew on openly accessible 
ideological material sourced from other parts of the Fascist Forge website. 
Fascist Aspirants: Who were they?  
This section provides an overview of those making introductory posts on Fascist Forge. 
Although we have taken the posts at face value for the purposes of analysis, we 
recognise that information provided therein may well be an unreliable guide to the 
actual identities of users. For various reasons, these may be faked and the information 
untrue, exaggerated or deliberately misleading. The posts are less a guide to the actual 
identities of users and more a representation of how they chose to construct and present 
themselves for others on the forum. 
Most newcomers (n=329) gave some indication as to their location. Forty 
different country locations were listed, although more than half of posters were based in 
the United States. The site was dominated by participants from English-speaking 
countries: the US, UK, Australia and Canada, somewhat consistent with previous work 
mapping extreme-right digital communities (Berger, 2018, p. 29). Non-English-
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speaking countries did make up a sizeable portion of posts, at around a quarter of the 
total (n=83), suggesting at least some appeal outside the Anglosphere.  
Just under half of posts (n=162) included some credible information on age.16 
Ages ranged from 7 to 69, with the youngest users claiming to be 7, 10 and 11.17 The 
mean age was 21.3 years, and 35 users claimed to be under the age of 18. This suggests 
that the user-base for Fascist Forge was relatively young which is consistent with arrest 
data linked to Universal Order fascist groups (Associated Press, 2018; BBC, 2019, 
2020; Counter Extremism Project, 2019). This should be viewed with caution, however, 
as older, more experienced users, may have been more cautious and less inclined to post 
personal information in a public forum.  
Indications are that the user-base was almost exclusively male. This is probably 
explained by the content of the site, which was highly misogynistic.18 It is also evident 
from the names and profile pictures chosen by users, as well as the content of posts. 
Only one newcomer openly identified as female and this was met with substantial 
                                                 
16 Where information was vague (e.g. mid 20s) an estimated age has been included for the 
purposes of this analysis based on the midpoint of any range e.g. mid 20s = 25. Posts that 
featured extreme right or Satanist numerology, e.g. 333, 88, were discounted. 
17 Based on the posts made these claims are doubtful and might be explained in other ways such 
as typos or deliberate lies, though a BBC documentary on ‘Hunting the neo-Nazis’ revealed 
one apparently senior user and propagandist to be just 15 years old (BBC1, 2020). Another 
user of Fascist Forge – convicted of terrorism offences in 2020 – had been under 18 at the 
time of his arrest (De Simone, 2020), and a leading figure of the ideologically similar group, 
Feuerkrieg Division, was identified as a 13-year-old from Estonia (DW, 2020).  
18 Rhetoric of violence against women was clearly evident, for example, in a comment thread on 
‘Justification of Rape’ from February 2019. 
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hostility from other users. It is perfectly possible that some of the other users may also 
have been women but choose not to disclose the fact.  
Seventy-two users gave some information about the length of time they had 
been involved in the extreme-right. Accounts were often vague on details, for example 
differing on what type of involvement they took to mark their entry. Estimates suggest 
the duration of involvement varied from 40 years claimed by one user, to some (n=15) 
claiming to have been involved for a year or less. The mean duration was 4 years. 
However, this masks considerable variation, with a standard deviation of 5.8 years. The 
median duration was 3 years. This measure suffers from the same issue as age, with 
older and more experienced users potentially more reluctant to provide information.  
In addition to information on age, gender and location, newcomers to the site 
were asked to specify their ‘ideology’ and ‘religion’ in the profiles. The majority 
associated themselves with general extreme-right political categories, with over 40 per 
cent (n=146) stating ‘National Socialist’ or ‘NS’, and a further 21 per cent (n=74) 
identifying as ‘Fascist’ (or a particular type, such as ‘Eco-Fascist’ or ‘White Identitarian 
Fascist’). Several made local or national connections by stipulating ‘American 
Futurism’,19 ‘Nordic National Socialist’, ‘Make Britain Great Again’, or ‘Australian 
National Socialist’. Beyond these were a wide variety of other identities including 
‘Mosleyite’, ‘Ultra-Nationalist’, ‘Nihilistic Stoicist’, ‘Chaotic Anarchist’, ‘Falangist’, 
‘Accelerationist’, ‘Volkish’ and ‘Third Positionist’. 
In line with the particular history of Fascist Forge, a significant minority (7 per 
cent; n=26) stated ‘Universal Order’ as either an ideological or religious identifier. The 
                                                 
19 Futurism is particularly relevant to the legacy of Iron March which was often represented as a 
forum for futurism-inspired fascists (SPLC, 2018).    
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principal religious categories were ‘Esotericism’ (12 per cent; n=43), with the majority 
of these stipulating ‘Esoteric Hitlerism’, and ‘Paganism’ (10 per cent; n=36). Despite a 
superficial reading of the contents of the website and the introductions revealing an 
antipathy to Christianity, more than 10 per cent (n=37) of newcomers nevertheless 
claimed some kind of Christian identity, including ‘Catholic’, ‘Protestant’ and ‘Eastern 
Orthodox’, often with the consequence that they were later excluded from membership. 
A few claimed an affiliation to another mainstream religion (though not Judaism or 
Islam), or to what one poster referred to as ‘Paths of the Old Gods’ – ‘Wotanism’, 
‘Odinism’ or ‘Asatru’ – but the other major identifiers were ‘Atheism’ and 
‘Agnosticism’ (n=18 and n=26 respectively), with a few still ‘working on it’, ‘in-
between religions’ or ‘none at the moment’. 
Motivations for Involvement  
Users were also encouraged to detail their reasons for seeking membership. The variety 
of ways they chose to do this made quantifying their motivations difficult but four basic 
motivations were identified: learning, teaching, community (e.g. discussion, speaking to 
‘like-minded people’) and activism (e.g. forming local groups, engaging in direct 
action).20  More than three-quarters of all users provided a reason for signing up; many 
listed more than one, so motivations are not mutually exclusive.  
The key motivations for participating in the site were the desire to talk and meet 
with other fascists (49 per cent, n=175) and learning more about fascism (49 per cent, 
                                                 
20 The evidence on why people registered on the website and their wider motivations was 
identified from data collected from the application of the framework described in the 
previous section – with specific reference to the purposive dimension. 
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n=175). This reflected the stated functions of Fascist Forge: in addition to continuing 
where Iron March left off, its purposes were ‘to make connections, share resources, 
organize and ultimately further the Fascist Worldview.’ It may also indicate the 
isolation felt by many users.  
In answer to ‘Why you registered?’, newcomers wrote repeatedly of their desire 
to ‘be part of something’ and to ‘connect with others’. The following terms were 
commonly used: ‘like-minded’; ‘community’; ‘connect’/‘connection’; ‘network’; 
‘share’. Most wrote in general terms, but some users identified the type of people with 
whom they wanted to engage, e.g. ‘Make some drinking and shooting buddies’ (id231); 
‘I am joining to be among my brothers and sisters of our White European Race’ 
(id114).21 Although the stated desire to connect with like-minded people was often 
perfunctory, on occasions it was linked to shared political aspirations and a future 
orientation: ‘Ideally, I’d like to become a person who is more prepared for what’s 
coming, and more knowledgeable about what we’re working towards.' (id197); 'I hope 
that I can aid in bringing our plans of a New Aryan Order to fruition.' (id217). Others 
made the connection between networking and activism: e.g. ‘I feel like I want to be 
more hands on in the movement. Like I mentioned previously Ive (sic) kind of been a 
floater and lurker, just learning and watching for years… I want to be part of a 
community.' (id319). 
In addition to their desire for connection, newcomers repeatedly stressed their 
desire to learn more about the ‘fascist worldview’, to improve their ‘understanding’ and 
                                                 
21 Individuals who posted introductions on the website have been identified with a reference 
number (e.g. id123) rather than by their pseudonym in order to minimise the possibility of 
identification by cross-referencing to other sites. 
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gain more ‘knowledge’.22 Although several felt the need to state their beliefs and 
demonstrate their ideological prowess, most were self-effacing in their readiness to 
improve themselves and learn from those more knowledgeable than themselves. Not 
infrequently this was expressed in terms of the desire for self-betterment or self-
fulfilment. One wanted to ‘liv[e] up to my fullest potential as a Fascist’ (id155); another 
to ‘accomplish personal enrichment’ (id33). Others used terms such as ‘expand’, 
‘better’, ‘gain’; ‘create’, ‘embrace’ and ‘deepen’ to express their motivation for 
learning. Many with relevant knowledge and skills were keen to teach as well as learn 
(7 per cent, n=25). They often used constructive and future-oriented terms such as 
‘share’, ‘contribute to’ or ‘participate in’ building a community or worldview. Still 
others expressed the desire to become more active or to meet with others to develop a 
local cell (18 per cent, n=63). 
The user-base of Fascist Forge was broadly young, male, of limited political 
experience, and primarily from English-speaking countries. Despite this there were also 
more confident and experienced political activists in the mix. Overall, the headline 
findings of this first stage analysis present a forum that identifies learning as a key 
objective both in how the website is designed and presented to users, as well as how 
                                                 
22 We note the self-conscious use of the phrase ‘fascist worldview’. Newcomers were frequently 
chastised by long-standing members for incorrectly referring to fascism as either an 
‘ideology’ or a ‘movement’, both of which were said to miss the point of fascism as an 
expression of essential truths inherent in the universe rather than artificially constructed 
human values. Those committing this error were instructed to go to the learning centre for 
further instruction, and to read Siege, A Squire’s Trial and other key works. 
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users engage with it and understand their motivations. Fascist Forge is seen as a place 
to connect and learn.  
Ideological, Social, Practical and Autonomous Learning in Fascist Forge 
We return now to the four themes identified in the research literature on ideology and 
terrorist learning in order to assess the nature of learning in Fascist Forge: explicit 
ideological teachings, social learning, learning by doing, and self-learning. 
Explicit Ideological Teachings 
As we suggested in the discussion of its ideological formation and relationships, Fascist 
Forge could be said to be a narrow way rather than a broad church. That is, as a forum, 
it understood itself to be elite and exclusionary, to reflect the values of the Universal 
Order rather than fascism more generally, and to pursue correct knowledge and 
understanding attained by immersion in selected texts and tested by critique and 
examination. This was recognised as a minority interest: ‘this site is dedicated 
completely to wholly "esoteric revolutionary fascism", which only a small handful of 
people subscribe to. Also, this form of fascism is so extreme that it will drive away 
moderates.’ (id254) 
With a commitment in its founding statement to take up where Iron March left 
off in sharing resources and furthering the worldview, a focus on transmitting and 
teaching the ideology was to be expected. This was highlighted by the presence on the 
site of a learning centre listing and providing links to key works. After posting their 
introductions, many newcomers were directed to the centre and instructed to read more 
deeply in order to gain a fuller understanding. There was a good deal of debate about 
the relative merits of key texts and about specific ideas, which was illustrative of the 
importance placed on ideological rigour. It was not unusual for long-standing members 
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to respond to a newcomer’s belief statement with detailed discussion on topics such as 
nationalism, accelerationism, esotericism, perennial philosophy, Plato’s Republic, 
anarchism or cultural Marxism.23 Awareness of historical context as well as ideological 
differences was not uncommon in such responses: 'To truly understand Siege and 
Universal Order you must first understand the historic reasons for NS ideology, the 
difficulties NS ideology faces in the modern day and the reasons for Siege being written' 
(comment on post by id106). But, equally, they were ready to correct a newcomer, for 
example by jumping on intellectualism or ‘psycho-rambling’, or by challenging a 
particular ideological interpretation by labelling it ‘obsolete’ or ‘soft’. Members often 
doubted the authenticity or ideological purity of newcomers, and followed up their 
introduction, for example, by quizzing them on the contents of Siege (comment on post 
by id351) or getting them to prove their occult credentials (comment on post by id207).  
Newcomers were dealt with as individual candidates. They presented their case 
and subjected themselves to the critical responses of existing members, some abasing 
themselves as novices, others inviting a fight: ‘Eat into me boys, I am ready for the 
shitstorm that's a-brewing.' (id252) No attempt was made to imitate offline learning 
settings, such as workshops, online group teaching, digital classrooms or the Salafist 
halaqah (Inge, 2017; Kenney, 2017; Wali, 2017), though a link was made to available 
lecture material, notably ‘Fascism 101’. Instruction and correction were conducted 
individually rather than collectively, using a Socratic method, with the aim being to 
identify and hone authentic and politically correct initiates rather than to recruit a mass 
of foot-soldiers with loose ideological connections.  
                                                 
23 It must be stressed that the phrase ‘more senior, long-standing members’ should not be taken 
to signify either age or maturity, only duration of involvement in the forum. See footnote 15. 
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The introduction phase was then followed by something more akin to a 
traditional educational model, with the use of an examination to test the knowledge and 
readiness of selected recruits (by that point a number had already been ‘liquidated’).24 
Once someone had proved themselves, either through their introduction or by being 
open to teaching and guidance, they were encouraged to ‘take the exam’. The exam had 
been part of the website from the outset, its purpose set out by the founder, Mathias, in 
early May 2018. 
In the effort to create and maintain a high quality Fascist community, Fascist 
Forge requires all prospective members to complete the Fascist Forge 
Membership Exam in order to become a fully vetted member of the forum. The 
purpose of the examination is to separate the genuine and devoted from the unfit 
and incompatible. This exam will weed out the pretenders, phonies and LARPers25 
while being easily passable by those either already familiar with, or willing to learn 
about, the Fascist worldview. (Fascist Forge, 2018) 
The exam consisted of 26 questions, mostly on knowledge and attitudes to Nazism, 
fascism, and racism (Lamoureux & Makuch, 2019). In the first phase of the website, 
before it went offline for the first time, information about the pass rate and the names of 
                                                 
24 The language used for rejecting candidates from further involvement in the forum was 
inspired by Nazi ideology and practice. They were ‘liquidated’ or ‘gassed’ and referred to 
thereafter as ‘Mengele victims’. 
25 LARP stands for Live Action Role Play and is a derogatory term often used to call out 
another as simply playing at ideological engagement or activism. LARPing is often looked 
down on as a ‘geeky’ activity. The use of the term however, somewhat ironically, also relies 
on an expected familiarity with tropes and language common in traditionally ‘geeky’ 
subcultures such as video, roleplay and tabletop gaming.  
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successful candidates were openly accessible. It was clear from this that most of those 
who took the exam got through it. They had become ‘vetted member[s] of the forum’ 
and were then allowed access to ‘a section only available to users’ (Lamoureux & 
Makuch, 2019). 
However, following the relaunch of the website, in what was probably intended 
to be a confidential exchange among senior members,26 a debate ensued about the role 
of the exam both for testing the commitment of candidates and policing entry into 
Fascist Forge by ‘feds and journos’. In a thread beginning 11 February 2019 entitled 
‘Approach to newcomers’, one member suggested that, ‘The exam should be harder. I 
suggest a college level philosophical/theoretical question, with a minimum of 250-500 
words’ (id143). Others raised the possibility of holding structured interviews, with 
‘technical questioning to test seriousness’ (id153), these having the advantage of 
requiring people to ‘think on their feet’ and not regurgitate what they’ve learnt from 
others on the site (id74).27  
Both the introductory posts and the exam were designed to draw out candidates’ 
ideological positions, to direct them to specific sources and to endorse key beliefs on 
fascism, nationalism and racism. They had a further purpose – and this brings us to the 
social aspect of learning in Fascist Forge – to help identify committed and authentic 
radicals and exclude those with ‘ill-intentions’. 
                                                 
26 Evident from a comment made on 14 March 2019 by id74. 




Explicit ideological learning and examination took place on the forum, but this did not 
happen in a social vacuum. Much of the activity revolved around belonging and 
inclusion, or rejection and exclusion. Although there were no designated teachers and 
no formal pupil-teacher relationships, conceptions and practices of rank, reputation and 
hierarchy were in operation, and in some cases were built into the very design of the 
forum. As we will show, however, the social aspect of learning also extended to the 
development of skills and activism offline.  
As the earlier discussion of their motivations showed, newcomers were drawn to 
the site for social reasons. They wanted to discuss ideas and learn from ‘like-minded’ 
individuals; they hoped to be part of something. In offline socio-religious organisations, 
as Barker (1984), Hundeide (2003), Kenney (2017) and others noted, this motivation 
was cultivated in the process of drawing in newcomers and helping them become more 
committed members. Kenney (2017, p. 6), for example, observed the importance of 
novices shadowing more experienced veterans and learning from companionship with 
peers. To what extent were similar processes observable in Fascist Forge? 
As far as we could tell from the introductory posts, no formal shadowing, 
imitation or mentoring practices were instituted. Newcomers were not paired with more 
experienced users, nor were they subject to constructive cultivation. That does not 
mean, however, that no social learning took place. On the one hand, newcomers took 
social learning into their own hands. By observing others, they acquired the social 
etiquette of introducing themselves and opening themselves up to critique. It was this 
initial ‘lurking’ that allowed the more adept and observant among them to present 
themselves as suitable, committed and ready to move on. Many others either failed to 
absorb the etiquette or did not have the skills (linguistic or otherwise) to grasp the 
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ideological and social demands of the Forum. Some simply realised this too late: ‘Sorry 
guys! I now understand what was the problem with my behavior and thinking' (id109); 
'Guys, I understood my mistake. Give me a second chance.' (id207) 
Little could prepare newcomers, however, for the critical barrage that their 
introductory posts would more than likely receive. Far from being a relationship of 
companionship, it was one of verbal abuse, with newcomers baited, mocked and 
subjected to humiliation, hate speech and name-calling. Some called the approach into 
question: one user, for example, declined to post an introduction writing, ‘I'm a little 
confused as to why the reception is so hostile here’ (idAnon). Others attempted a robust 
defence, often digging themselves in deeper, like the 13-year old ‘Protestant National 
Socialist’ (id90) who, when criticised for his religious convictions, came back with the 
comment that Hitler had believed the perfect Aryan to be Protestant, only to be told to 
go away and learn more about the anti-Christian nature of Universal Order. Senior 
members, however, were clear about the value of their approach: ‘the "attacks" on new 
members should be seen as opportunity to explain or gain trust by the newcomer’, said 
one (id55), with another commenting that ‘ironic critiques currently used to challenge 
newcomers’ intros will by default educate them.’ (id74) 
Newcomers could be in no doubt about the reputation, rank and roles of other 
users as these were clearly shown in their profiles, with beginners grouped as ‘guests’ or 
‘newcomers’, rising to ‘members’ on passing the exam, and ultimately as ‘extremists’, 
‘enforcers’ or ‘propagandists’. At the peak of the hierarchy was the founder and ‘Leader 
Supreme’ (Mathias), with a high reputation and a post ranked at the top level (denoted 
by five dots on his profile). Although the specific purpose of these clusters was not 
made clear in comments posted in the open area, the identities, ranks and reputations of 
key individuals could have left new recruits in little doubt about who had status in the 
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forum – whether derived from length of membership, number of posts (reputation), or 
named role. Whether such status led to those individuals becoming exemplars to be 
imitated or followed is not known. However, to attract praise or even criticism from one 
of the top members must have felt like an achievement, even if it did not signify a 
meaningful relationship. 
As we saw earlier, newcomers did not limit their aspirations to participation in 
ideological debate on the forum, but claimed to seek more active involvement offline, 
for example, through the development of local cells. One, for example, stated his ‘main 
goal here is to better organize and contact people in my area for meetups and the like' 
(id84), one aimed ‘to discuss, prepare and coordinate real life action' (id296), and 
another to 'start a real-life fascist group like Atomwaffen' (id214).28 The drive to learn 
and participate in a small but active group with like-minded compatriots was repeatedly 
expressed by users in diverse locations, from California, Nebraska, Canada, Brazil, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia and the South of England. The 
connection between ideology, social organisation and practice was illustrated by those 
who sought to participate in communities where they could ‘integrate this worldview 
into my lived experience more fully’ (id200) or could apply ‘National Socialism to 
Australian conditions' (id333).  
                                                 
28 That extremists like those on this forum sought to take the next step to fulfilling such goals 
was highlighted by investigative journals researching The Base, in which recruiters like 
Mathias (Fascist Forge’s ‘Leader Supreme’) participated in interviews with candidates for 
locally-based cells (BBC1, 2020). 
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Learning by Doing 
The apocalyptic nature of the ideology, with its focus on the acceleration of societal 
collapse, called for particular expertise and behaviours. As one user said, he wanted 'To 
know when the day comes and be prepared for it' (id250). Important though it was, 
ideological learning was not sufficient on its own; it needed to be paired with training 
and experience in appropriate skills. Newcomers were asked to give an account of these, 
and it was evident that some skills were more highly valued than others, especially 
those linked to survivalism (with specific references to ‘bushcraft’, ‘living off-grid’ and 
‘wilderness’ or ‘outdoor survival’), and training in firearms. Thirteen individuals 
mentioned their military experience. At times, newcomers were either praised for 
having such skills or encouraged to acquire them. One was told to 'master survival skills 
for when the system inevitably falls apart. Locating and purifying water, collecting 
firewood, hunting, fishing, basic agriculture, basic carpentry, preserving food' 
(comment made to id125); another was told that ‘your real world skills are nice. Perhaps 
studying the worldview/reading more is a good next step for you’ (comment made to 
id141), showing the importance of balancing both practical and ideological learning. 
In her article on violence, politics and the skills of the body, Crone (2016, pp. 
600-601) linked the acquisition of Islamist extremist ideology with ‘the transformation 
of embodied capacities’. A similar process was evident in Fascist Forge with 
newcomers valuing ‘those who live as they believe’ (id218), and asserting the need to 
‘train my mind, my body and spirit’ (id107). A balanced portfolio of soft skills, such as 
reading, graphics, IT expertise and spiritual interests (such as meditation, astral 
projection, and interest in the occult) alongside the development of physical 
accomplishments, was endorsed. 
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Although some spoke directly of wanting to accelerate the collapse, exterminate 
enemies or carry out lethal violence, they were always suspected of being ‘feds’.29 
Much more common were those who stated their desire for personal accomplishment 
and fulfilment according to the worldview of radical fascism. However, what we saw in 
these introductory posts was not the reality of physical training and real-world action, 
but the aspiration to acquire and perform these for the cause. These newcomers were 
not ‘walking the walk’, as were those described by Kenney (2017) in his account of 
street activism in al-Muhajiroun, but ‘talking the walk’. The extent to which they might 
have been ready or willing to actively follow up cannot be known from these posts 
alone. 
Self-Learning 
A final feature of terrorist learning that we found to be somewhat underdeveloped in the 
research literature was autonomous or self-learning. In the ‘post-organisational far-
right’ in an online milieu, this is especially important because the structures and 
mechanisms that we might normally associate with ideological indoctrination and 
operational training in extremist groups may have altered or be unavailable (Mulhall, 
2018). Both recruitment and learning have to be understood in a digital context where, 
even if individual motivations are similar to those in offline extremism, the possibility 
of disengagement, browsing, masquerade and experimental play have to be factored in.  
                                                 
29 The trope of the ‘fed’ as an outside agitator is a common one in the extreme-right online 
milieu, especially the ‘terrorgram’ community built on the dark social application, Telegram. 
Open calls for violence are often treated as suspicious and an attempt to entrap other 
participants in the milieu. 
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Understanding how individuals construct and comprehend their learning journey 
was helped in the case of Fascist Forge by the fact that newcomers were asked directly 
to say something about their ‘political history’. Their answers, like all autobiographical 
materials in extremist settings, are necessarily self-fashioned and retrospective 
(Copeland, 2019; Knott & Lee, 2020). They may stretch a truth or be entirely fictitious. 
Unreliable though they may be, they tell us something important about how journeys 
into fascism are told and how newcomers learn from one another to forge their political 
identities. 
The typical story line was one of radicalisation, not in the sense of grooming but 
of becoming increasingly extreme, often moving from political liberalism or moderate 
conservatism through various right-wing positions to their current position as fascists. 
This was depicted in terms of movement through various ideological stances and 
identities. 
• 'Stalinist -> Nazi -> the tanking of modern civilization and return to nature.’ 
(id43) 
• ‘Classical Liberal ----> Flat Earther/Anti-Vaxxer ----> Fascist’ (id137) 
• 'Patriotard -> muslim basher-> alt-right->national socialist-> currently looking 
into Universal Order’ (id337) 
• 'I'm a typical case. I went through the so-called "Four Stages of Red-Pill." 
Generic conservative, libertarian, radical Right (alt-Right), and Traditionalism 
(Fascism).' (id23) 
Although these journeys were experienced as personal, they drew on classic conversion 
tropes (Rambo & Farhadian, 2014), such as ‘searching’, ‘discovery’, ‘realization’, 
‘awakening’, the ‘light bulb’ moment, and a sense of being consumed or ‘eaten up’ by 
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the ideology. One ‘got hit with the truth big time and it all clicked for me’ (id20); 
another ‘realized the very pulse of this expression of the worldview allowed me to reach 
a higher consciousness’ (id158). In a minority of cases, they were helped along this path 
by family members or peers (e.g. a National Socialist grandfather or Pagan upbringing), 
but more often they saw it as natural or predestined, whilst also being personally 
crafted: 'My path to Fascism has come organically through esoteric and occult work.' 
(id94); ‘I personally never needed propaganda or anyone else's influence to awaken, and 
I'm sure the same applies to many here. If fate has determined that one will awaken, that 
person will.’ (id38) 
Reading and personal study were said to play a significant role in these journeys, 
the focus being on key texts like Mein Kampf and Siege, but with reference also made to 
audio-visual and online consumption, e.g. of Mosley’s speeches, Discord servers and 
the Iron March website. Although most grasped the ideology in this way, a minority 
attributed their learning in part to their participation in gangs or extremist groups, such 
as Skinheads or Blood and Honor. Crucially though, as several intimated, they ended up 
on their own. As one said, ‘those groups never satisfied me, so I have been walking the 
lone wolf route, being that movementarians can't grasp the mindset of violence, 
radicalism, and or taking action’ (id348). In articulating the path of isolated 
individualism, this newcomer testified to the interrelationship between his personal 
journey and an ideology which calls for individuals to steep themselves in the particular 
worldview of Universal Order whilst dropping out of the system and renouncing the 
idea of fascism as a movement. 
Fascist Forge: A Community of Practice?  
The case study of Fascist Forge reveals some significant differences with the 
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established model of ideological learning in extremist groups based on communities of 
practice. Despite some similarities, such as the clear identification of different levels of 
status, and external links to introductory lecture material such as ‘Fascism 101’, Fascist 
Forge did not offer its users the opportunities for formal instruction, shadowing 
exemplars, gaining practical experience of activism, or the ideological nurturing seen, 
for example, in a community of practice like al-Muhajiroun (Kenney, 2017, 2018; see 
also Crone, 2016; Hundeide, 2003; Wali, 2017). Some of these differences can be 
explained by the technological context of an online forum. Fascist Forge participants 
did not engage in real-world, organised activism in the same way as those in al-
Muhajiroun (or at least this was not something promoted in the open part of the 
website). They were not afforded the possibility of being paired with and shadowing 
more experienced members. Neither did they engage in group learning. In Fascist 
Forge, however, the absence of a formal framework for social learning – albeit one 
designed for an online setting – was also a function of its ideology. Universal Order 
ideology, with its values of elitism and individualism, and rejection of any attempt at 
organisation, was not well placed to support a nurturing learning environment. By 
choice, Fascist Forge presented a barren and hostile environment for newcomers, where 
they were expected to sink or swim depending on their resilience and willingness to 
accept the underpinning values on offer.  
Is it appropriate then to argue for Fascist Forge as a community of practice? 
Would it not be better to understand it as an online resource for autonomous individuals 
who share a worldview and a desire to discuss it with others? Fascist Forge is clearly 
not like al-Muhajiroun, a strong community of practice with well-developed apprentice-
veteran relationships and mechanisms for ideological and practical learning. 
Nevertheless, despite technological and ideological constraints, it provided newcomers 
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with opportunities for social interaction and learning to help them move from the 
ideological periphery to the centre. By lurking, they were able to witness and then 
imitate the self-presentation of high-status members and their engagement with others 
online. By experimentation, they were able to explore the kind of appeals and positions 
that gained favour within the forum, and to learn from the failures of others. Formal 
online learning was not on offer but, by observing the interactions that took place, 
newcomers were effectively able to sit in on an informal masterclass on how to look and 
sound like a Universal Order fascist online.  
For these reasons, Fascist Forge could be said to constitute a weak online 
community of users engaged in limited social learning practices, with an orientation 
towards self-learning rather than organised pedagogy. Aspirants were able to pick up 
the basics of how to behave, but in-depth knowledge and commitment could only be 
won by deeper engagement with more complex and abstract material in recommended 
texts and by participation beyond the introductory level (in the members-only section of 
the site).  
 
 Conclusion – Ideological Learning in the Extreme-right Online Milieu.     
The extreme-right online milieu that forms the basis for this paper is a complicated 
place, populated by thousands of online channels and users competing for influence and 
status. Users are faced with near infinite ideological choice, and so Fascist Forge was 
only representative of a small number of users interested in the most extreme 
interpretation of fascism available; it cannot be interpreted as a typical case 
representative of the entire milieu. Neither can the introductory posts of its users be 
assumed to be a reliable guide to their real-world identities (e.g. gender, age or location) 
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or their actual views, but instead should be seen as a representation of how they chose to 
construct and present themselves for others on the forum. Their testimonies and 
interactions did not focus on learning as such, but what they said about their motivations 
for participation and their ideological journeys, and how they said it, provided valuable 
data for an analysis of extremist learning online and a comparative application of the 
community of practice model. For ethical reasons, our analysis was limited to material 
that was openly available on the website. Furthermore, by choice our approach was 
qualitative and interpretive, leaving open the possibility that other researchers might use 
a different model of learning or frame of analysis and thus draw other conclusions. 
Despite these limitations, the analysis of Fascist Forge raises some distinct concerns 
about the role of learning in such contexts.  
The first, and most obvious, is the accessibility of this material. Fascist Forge 
was an online forum that openly promoted an interpretation of fascism that was very 
extreme, and in doing so made freely available supportive ideological material as well 
as the necessary tools and concepts for identifying further material through independent 
search. The forum received a degree of mainstream media coverage, even while it was 
still active (BBC, 2019; Lamoureux & Makuch, 2019). The age profile of the users 
suggests that at least some were finding and interpreting this material early on in their 
extremist careers – this is endorsed by the young age of several users later convicted of 
terrorism offences (BBC, 2019; De Simone, 2020). While Fascist Forge was anything 
but a nurturing environment, it was nevertheless acting as a gateway to self-learning 
about Siege, Iron March, and the Universal Order. Arguably, for senior members, it also 
helped in the identification and preparation of committed newcomers (those with the 
right views and useful skills) for future ideological and practical engagement – whether 
online or offline.  
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A second area of concern is mutation. Kenney (2017, pp. 10-12) noted in his 
analysis of al-Muhajiroun that the group’s beliefs and the insularity of its approach to 
ideological learning placed a limit on innovation. The beliefs of the group were 
considered to be immutable, and recruits were explicitly guided in how they should 
interpret texts and what lessons to learn. While there was an absolute insistence on 
ideological purity on Fascist Forge, there was little in the way of formal doctrinal 
instruction and little possibility for enforcement, given that users were free to 
discontinue or to surf elsewhere. Newcomers were left to get on with interpreting the 
texts as best they could and then expected to reach the ‘correct’ conclusions, or else face 
humiliation and verbal punishment from the community. The lack of formal guidance, 
together with the voluntary nature of online engagement, seems to open up far-greater 
potential for ideological deviation and innovation than might be the case in an offline 
extremist group like al-Muhajiroun. Put another way, while the fate of all the newbies 
who flamed out on their introduction is largely unknown, it would be surprising had 
they not incorporated at least some of the lessons learned at Fascist Forge into their 
personal ideological landscapes. Faced with such dense ideological material and little 
explicit guidance on interpreting it, the odds increase of recruits arriving at their own 
homebrew ideologies, with all the complications this may bring about.   
Finally, and explicitly related to Fascist Forge, we know there was a deeper 
level to Fascist Forge engagement beyond the public facing forum. Investigative 
reporting and references within the data harvested from the site itself strongly indicate 
that Fascist Forge may have been something of a staging post and recruitment area for 
extreme-right groupuscules. Most tellingly, site founder Mathias was identified as 
participating in recruitment interviews for the Universal Order inspired group, The Base 
(BBC1, 2020). In recorded conversations, interviewers discussed potential new recruits 
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and the need for ideological shaping. This hints at a lengthier and more directed process 
of ideological learning for those seeking a deeper involvement. 
Overall, there are traces of the community of practice model exhibited by 
Fascist Forge. However, the emergence of online extremist milieus suggests a need to 
reconsider the community of practice model for an online environment. Fascist Forge 
undeniably operated as an online resource for individuals looking to discuss and read 
more about Universal Order fascism, but it was more than that. It offered informal 
social learning, albeit in an unusually hostile context, with formal learning offloaded 
onto recruits who were expected to take responsibility for their own ideological 
indoctrination and skills development.    
References 
Akers, R. (1998). Social learning and social structure: A general theory of crime and 
deviance. Northwestern University Press. 
Associated Press (2018, June 9). Florida neo-Nazi leader gets 5 years for having 
explosive material. Into America. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/florida-neo-nazi-leader-gets-5-years-having-explosive-material-n836246. 
Bandura, A. (1971). Social learning theory. General Learning Press. 
Barker, E. (1984). The making of a Moonie: Brainwashing or choice? Blackwell.  
BBC (2019, June 18). Teenage neo-Nazis jailed over terror offences. BBC News. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48672929. 
BBC (2020, January 17). FBI arrests three more members of right-wing extremist group 
‘The Base’. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
51144177. 
BBC1 (2020, June 22). Panorama: Hunting the neo-Nazis. BBC Programmes. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006t14n 
Beekers, D. (2015). A moment of persuasion: Travelling preachers and Islamic 
pedagogy in the Netherlands. Culture and Religion, 16(2), 193–214. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14755610.2015.1058530 
Bellingcat. (2019). Massive white supremacist message board leak: How to access and 





Berger, J. M. (2018). The Alt-Right Twitter census. Vox Pol.  
Berlet, C. (2008, April 7). When hate went online: Early online systems by racists, 
white supremacists, & neo-Nazis. Research for Progress. 
http://www.researchforprogress.us/topic/34691/when-hate-went-online/. 
Berntzen, L. E. & Sandberg, S. (2014). The collective nature of lone wolf terrorism: 
Anders Behring Breivik and the anti-Islamic social movement, Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 26(5), 759-779. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.767245 
Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009). Exploring Stormfront: A virtual community of the radical 
right. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 31(11), 989–1007.  
Brown, J. S. & Duguid, P. (1999). Organizational learning and communities-of-
practice: Toward a unified view of working, learning, and innovation. 
Organization Science 2(1), 40–57. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2634938. 
Copeland, S. (2019). Kin and peer contexts and militant involvement: A narrative 
analysis, [Unpublished doctoral thesis]. Lancaster University, UK. 
Counter Extremism Project (2019, November 25). Extremist content online: U.K. Neo-
Nazi active on online forum Fascist Forge arrested. 
https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-content-online-uk-neo-nazi-
active-online-forum-fascist-forge-arrested. 
Crone, M. (2016). Radicalization revisited: Violence, politics and the skills of the body. 
International Affairs 92(3), 587–604. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12604. 
De Koster, W. & Houtman, D. (2008). ‘Stormfront is like a second home to me’: On 
virtual community formation by right-wing extremists. Information, 
Communication & Society, 11(8), 1155–1176. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13691180802266665 
De Simone, D. & Winston, A. (2020, June 22). Neo-Nazi militant group grooms 
teenagers. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53128169. 
De Simone, D. (2020, October 16). Harry Vaughan: House of Lords clerk’s son a ‘neo-
Nazi Satanist’. BBC News. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-
54568916.  
Devi, S. (1958). The lightening and the sun. Temple Press. 
41 
 
Dolnik, A. (2007). Understanding terrorist innovation: Technology, tactics and global 
trends. Routledge. 
Drake, C. J. M. (1998). Terrorists’ target selection. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Due Enstad, J. (2018). Right-wing terrorism and violence in Putin’s Russia. 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 12(6), 89–103. 
DW (2020). Far-right terrorist ringleader found to be teenager in Estonia. Retrieved July 
1, 2020, from https://www.dw.com/en/far-right-terrorist-ringleader-found-to-be-
teenager-in-estonia/a-53085442. 
Everton, S. F. (2016). Social networks and religious violence. Review of Religious 
Research, 58, 191–217. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-015-0240-3.  
Fascist Forge (2018). About Us. Retrieved November 29, 2019, from 
https://fascistforge.com/index.php?app=cms&module=pages&controller=page&
path=articles.html/articles/about-us-r2. 
Forest, J. F. (Ed.). (2006). Teaching terror: Strategic and tactical learning in the 
terrorist world. Rowman & Littlefield.  
Freeden, M. (2000). Practising ideology and ideological practices. Political Studies 48, 
302–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00261 
Freiburger, T. & Crane, J. (2008). A systematic examination of terrorist use of the 
Internet. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 2(1), 309–319. 
Galonnier, J. & de los Rios, D. (2016). Teaching and learning to be religious: 
Pedagogies of conversion to Islam and Christianity. Sociology of Religion, 
77(1), 59–81. https://doi.org/10.1093/socrel/srv055   
Gammelgaard, J. (2010). Knowledge retrieval through virtual communities of practice. 
Behaviour & Information Technology, 29(4), 349–362. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01449290903548406 
Gardell, M. (2003). Gods of the blood: The Pagan revival and white separatism. Duke 
University Press.  
Gaudette, T., Scrivens, R., and Venkatesh, V., (2020). The Role of the Internet in 
facilitating violent extremism: Insights from right wing extremists. Terrorism 




Gendron, A. (2017). The call to jihad: Charismatic preachers and the Internet. Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism, 40(1), 44–61. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157406 
Gill, P. Horgan, J., Hunter, S. T. & Cushenbery, L. (2013). Malevolent creativity in 
terrorist organizations, Journal of Creative Behavior, 47(2), 125–151. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.28 
Goodrick-Clarke, N. (2003). Black Sun: Aryan cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the politics 
of identity. New York University Press. 
Haas, A., Abonneau, D., Borzillo, S. & Guillaume, L.-P. (2020). Afraid of engagement? 
Towards an understanding of engagement in virtual communities of practice. 
Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 1–12. Advance Online 
Publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/14778238.2020.1745704 
Holbrook, D. & Horgan, J. (2019). Terrorism and ideology: Cracking the nut. 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 13(6), 2–15. 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspective
s-on-terrorism/2019/issue-6/01-holbrook-and-horgan.pdf 
Holt, T. J., Freilich, J. D. & Chermak, S. M. (2017). Internet-based radicalization as 
enculturation to violent deviant subcultures. Deviant Behavior, 38(8), 855–869. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2016.1197704 
Horgan, J (2009). Walking Away from Terrorism. Routledge. 
Horgan, J. G., Taylor, M., Bloom, M. & Winter, C. (2017). From cubs to lions: A six 
stage model of child socialization into the Islamic State. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 40(7), 645–664. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221252 
Hundeide, K. (2003). Becoming a committed insider. Culture & Psychology, 9(2), 107–
127. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X0392001 
Inge, A. (2016). The making of a Salafi Muslim woman: Paths to conversion. Oxford 
University Press. 
Iron March, (2015). Next Leap. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from 
https://archive.org/stream/ironmarchnextleap/IronMarch%20-
%20Next%20Leap_djvu.txt. 
Jackson, B. A., Baker, J. C., Chalk, P., Cragin, K., Parachini, J. V. & Trujillo, H. R. 
(2005). Aptitude for destruction: Organizational learning in terrorist groups 
and its implications for combating terrorism. RAND Corporation. 
43 
 
Jackson, P. (2020). Pioneers of World Wide Web Fascism: The British extreme-right 
and Web 1.0. In M. Littler & B. Lee (Eds.), Digital extremisms: Readings in 
violence, radicalisation and extremism in the online space. Palgrave.  
Johnson, B. and Feldman, M. (forthcoming) Siege: ‘Sheer political terror’. International 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism.  
Kaplan, J. (1998). Religiosity and the radical right: Toward the creation of a new ethnic 
identity. In J. Kaplan & T. Bjørgo. (Eds.). Nation and race: The developing 
Euro-American racist subculture, (pp. 102–125). Northeastern University Press. 
Kenney, M. (2017): A community of true believers: Learning as process among “The 
Emigrants”. Terrorism and Political Violence. Advance Online Publication. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1346506. 
Kenney, M. (2018). The Islamic State in Britain: Radicalization and resilience in an 
activist network. Cambridge University Press. 
Kettle, L. & Mumford, A. (2017). Terrorist learning: A new analytical framework, 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(7), 523–538. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237224. 
Khalil, J., Horgan, J., & Zeuthen, M. (2019). The attitudes-behaviors corrective (ABC) 
model of violent extremism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1699793 
Khalil, J., Horgan, J., & Zeuthen, M. (2020). The ABC model: Clarifications and 
elaborations. Terrorism and Political Violence, 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1776703 
Koehler, D. (2015). Contrast societies. Radical social movements and their relationships 
with their target societies. A theoretical model. Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression, 7(1), 18–34. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2014.977325 
Knott, K. & Lee, B. J. (2020). Ideological transmission in extremist contexts: Towards a 
framework of how ideas are shared. Politics, Religion and Ideology, 21(1), 1–
23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2020.1732938. 
Körner, S. & Staller, M. S. (2018). Pedagogy of terrorism. Mujahid Guide revisited. 




Lamoureux, M. (2019, February 15). Fascist Forge, the online neo-Nazi recruitment 
forum, is down. Vice. https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/43zn8j/fascist-forge-
the-online-neo-nazi-recruitment-forum-is-down. 
Lamoureux, M. & Makuch, B. (2019, January 29). Online neo-Nazis are increasingly 
embracing terror tactics. Vice. 
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/8xynq4/online-neo-nazis-are-increasingly-
embracing-terror-tactics. 
Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Leidig, E. (2020). Hindutva as a variant of right-wing extremism. Patterns of Prejudice. 
Advanced Online Publication. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2020.1759861. 
Lee, B. & Knott, K. (2016). Ideological transmission I: The family, Centre for Research 
and Evidence on Security Threats, https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/family-
ideological-transmission/. 
Lee, B. & Knott, K. (2017). Ideological transmission II: Peers, education and prisons, 
Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats, 
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/. 
Lee, B. & Knott, K. (2018). Ideological transmission III: Political and religious 
organisations, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2018). 
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/political-religious-organisations/. 
Lee, B. & Knott, K. (2020). More grist to the mill? Reciprocal radicalisation and 




Macklin, G. (2015). The ‘cultic milieu’ of Britain’s ‘New Right’. In N. Copsey & J. E. 
Richardson. (Eds.). Cultures of Post-War British Fascism (pp. 177–201). 
Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315727257-11 
Macklin, G. (2018). ‘Only bullets will stop us!’ The banning of National Action in 





Maher, S. (2014, November 6). From Portsmouth to Kobane: the British jihadis fighting 
for ISIS. New Statesman. http://www.newstatesman.com/2014/10/portsmouth-
kobane.  
Mason, J. (1986). The Course. Siege, 15(6). 
McLagan, G. and Lowles, N. (2000) Mr Evil. John Blake Publishing. 
Morrison, J. F. (2017). Copying to be different: Violent dissident Irish Republican 
learning. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(7), 586–602. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1237225. 
Mulhall, J. (2018) A Post-organisational far right? Retrieved on July 22, 2020, from 
https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/state-of-hate-2018/online-
radicalisation/post-organisational-far-right/  
Munn, L. (2019). Alt-Right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online. First 
Monday, 24(6-3). 
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/10108/7920  
Önnerfors, A. (2017. Between Breivik and PEGIDA: The absence of ideologues and 
leaders on the contemporary European far right. Patterns of Prejudice, 51(2), 
159–175. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2017.1302642 
Pearson, E. (2015). The case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for theory on online 
radicalization, ISIS women, and the gendered jihad. Policy and Internet, 8(1), 5–
33. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.101 
Rambo, L.R. & Farhadian, C. E. (2014). The Oxford handbook of religious conversion. 
Oxford University Press. 
Ranstorp, M. & Normark, M. (2015). Introduction: Understanding terrorism, innovation 
and learning: Al-Qaeda and beyond. In M. Ranstorp & M. Normark (Eds.), 
Understanding terrorism, innovation and learning, (pp. 1–15). Routledge. 
Rebours, A. (2019). The dual aspects of siege terror. 19 September 2019. 
https://siegekultur.biz/the-dual-aspects-of-siege-terror/ accessed 8/7/20.  
Scourfield, J., Gilliat-Ray, S., Khan, A. & Otri, S. (2013). Muslim childhood: Religious 
nurture in a European context. Oxford University Press. 
Senholt, J. C. (2013). Secret identities in the sinister tradition: Political esotericism & 
the convergence of radical Islam, Satanism and National Socialism in the Order 
of the Nine Angles. In P. Faxneld & J. A. Petersen (Eds.), The Devil’s party: 
Satanism in Modernity, (pp. 250–274). Oxford University Press. 
46 
 
Sexton, J. (2019, August 14). Las Vegas man arrested in plots against Jews was said to 
be affiliated with Atomwaffen Division. ProPublica. 
https://www.propublica.org/article/las-vegas-man-conor-climo-was-said-to-be-
affiliated-with-atomwaffen-division. 
Slavros, A. (2017). Zero tolerance. No publisher.  
Snow, D. A. & Byrd, S. C. (2007). Ideology, framing processes, and Islamic terrorist 
movements. Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review, 12(1), 119–36 
SPLC (2018) Atomwaffen and the SIEGE parallax: How one neo-Nazi’s life’s work is 




SPLC (2019) Mysterious Neo-Nazi advocated terrorism for six years before 
disappearance. Southern Poverty Law Center. Retrieved July 22, 2020, from 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2019/05/21/mysterious-neo-nazi-
advocated-terrorism-six-years-disappearance. 
Stenersen, A. (2013). ‘Bomb-making for beginners’: Inside al Al-Qaeda e-learning 
course. Perspectives on Terrorism, 7(1), 25–37. 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/241/html 
Subcomondante X (2019). Fascist Forge makes a bumpy return. Retrieved December 5, 
2019, from https://medium.com/americanodyssey/fascist-forge-neo-nazi-forum-
returns-online-f7cb1f672f94. 
Sweeney, M. M. (2019). Leaderless resistance and the truly leaderless: A case study test 
of the literature-based findings. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(7), 617-
635. https://doi-org/10.1080/1057610X.2017.1407480 
Thompson, K. (2001). Watching the Stormfront: White nationalists and the building of 
community in cyberspace. Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social 
and Cultural Practice, 45(1), 32–52. 
Wali, F. (2017). Islamist indoctrination: Exploring the techniques used by Hizb ut-
Tahrir to radicalize young British Muslims. Journal for Deradicalization, 11, 
30–58. http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/98  
Weill, K. (2018). Satanism drama is tearing apart the murderous Neo-Nazi group 





Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning and identity. 
Cambridge University Press.  
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West. Rowman 
and Littlefield. 
Wilner, A. S. & Dubouloz, C.-J. (2011). Transformative radicalization: Applying 
learning theory to Islamist radicalization. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34(5), 
418–438. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.561472. 
Young, E. (2019). Arioperennialism: One blood, one truth. Retrieved December 12, 
2019, from https://siegekultur.biz/arioperennialism-one-blood-one-truth/ 
 
 
Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council, 
under Grant ES/N009614/1 (Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats) with 
funding from the UK Intelligence Community and participating universities. 
 
